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ABSTRACT
Title of Research Paper:

A Critical Review of Existing Chinese Maritime
Surveillance Capability: Research on Developing an
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Maritime
Surveillance System for China MSA
MSc

Degree:

The maritime surveillance has become increasingly important in recent decades, due
to the dramatic expand of various activities in maritime sector globally. As an
important player in the global markets, China has set up a comprehensive maritime
surveillance system accordingly. However, few studies have been conducted, by
neither scholars nor the Chinese maritime authority, to assess and evaluate the
current maritime surveillance system. To fill this research gap, this paper presented a
critical review on the system and reached to a conclusion that the system needs
enhancement and adjustment, as a result of the inherent problems and projected
challenges. In order to solve the discovered problems and deal with the challenges
ahead, relevant researches have been carried out for finding available solutions to
enhance and improve the Chinese maritime surveillance system. The result of the
researches indicate that maritime UAV system, which is detailed and studied in the
subsequent sections, is considerably suitable for solving some underlying problems
of the Chinese maritime surveillance system, and thus are recommended for the
decision maker(s) of the China MSA, after a general feasibility analysis. At last,
limitations and implications of the research paper are provided for future studies.

KEY WORDS: Maritime Monitor Technique, Maritime Surveillance System,
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background Information
Shipping, which carries more than 90% of world trade in volume (Ma, 2015;
UNCTAD, 2015), has been playing a significant role in international trading for more
than 4000 years (Stopford, 2009). The international shipping is vital to China, which
is the largest international trading entity (NBSC, 2015) and greatly benefited from
the international trade. During the last decade, Chinese shipping has been developing
rapidly (Figure 1.1), ad hoc in 2015, throughputs of Chinese main ports and
containers have reached record 8.147 billion tons and 212 million TEU, respectively.

Figure.1.1 The performance of Chinese shipping in 2005-2014
Source: Compiled by the author based on the statistics from NBSC1
1

See more from the Chinese Ministry of Transport: http://www.moc.gov.cn/
1

Correspondingly, the shipping related activities have been increasing drastically
during the same period (Figure 1.2). According to the prediction of UNCTAD (2015),
the world seaborne trade (especially China) will gain substantial development in near
future. Additionally, China’s continuous pursue of maritime power in this millennium,
will undoubtedly lead to considerable increase of vessel fleet both in number and
DWT, as the “ocean economy” accounts for 10% of China’s GDP (Bo, 2014).
Therefore, it is reasonable to forecast the trend of maritime activities within the
coastal regions of China would be up-rise in the years to come.

Figure.1.2 Vessel entered and left Chinese Port in 2005 to 2014
Source: Compiled by the author based on China MSA Statistics2
As maritime surveillance has been more of public safe, environmental and
economical interest, which improves maritime safety and environmental protection,
especially, monitoring vessels, illegal activities and oil spills are of grave
significance (Bloisi et al, 2015; Braca et al, 2015), has drew worldwide attentions in
recent decades, in order to effectively and efficiently enhance maritime safety.

Therefore, to cope with the rapid change of maritime industry, it is necessary for the
2

Detail of the statistics are based on the internal sources
2

competent authority, namely the China MSA, to set up a comprehensive maritime
surveillance (MS) system to monitor maritime activities so as to ensure maritime
safety, marine environmental protection and maritime security. Indeed, MSA has
been making great efforts to build up a nationwide maritime surveillance system,
which consist of VTS, AIS, CCTV, LRIT, GPS/COMPASS and satellite based AIS
systems, (Song, 2010; Cai, 2011b; Zhao, 2012; China MSA, 2016) and achieved
remarkable progresses, for instance, in 2015 the number of maritime accident is 213,
related casualty is 222 and direct economic loss is 349 million RMB, a 18.3%, 10%
and 31.9% decrease, respectively, on an annual basis (Ministry of Transport, 2016).
However, as maritime activities (including ferries, fishery vessels, yachts, oil
drilling-rigs and etc) in China have been significantly increasing and expanding
further away from shores, along with the shipping’s trend toward mega-ships
(Nakazawa, 2015), and more illegal shipping-related activities occur (Li, 2012; Cui,
2015), the risks associated with maritime activities soar thereupon. In line with report
of Transport Planning and Research Institute (2014), the emergencies happened
50nm away from shore have grown substantially (Figure 1.3), which indicates an
urgency to overhaul current maritime surveillance system to detect and tackle
maritime emergencies in an effective and efficient manner.

Figure 1.3 Dangerous situations (and ratio) happened 50nm away from Chinese coast
(Source: TPRT, 2014)
3

However, to date, no comprehensive assessment or review of Chinese maritime
surveillance (MS) system has been conducted. Hence, in order to fill this lacuna and
further enhance maritime safety, security and the protection of marine environment,
it would be imperative to critically review the Chinese MS system, using an
applicable solution to improve it as necessary.

1.2 Objectives of Research
The Chinese Ministry of Transport has been investing heavily into the MS system,
which has been renewed on the existing basis in previous years. Progress and
achievement have been made, but the system still has constantly been criticized by
many for its lack of effectiveness and efficiency. As one of MSA staff, who served in
both front-line and technology infrastructure department, the author would like to
take this opportunity to delve into the current Chinese MS system and try to find out
an applicable solution to solve existing problems within MS domain in a
cost-effective manner. Therefore, the objectives of this research paper are illustrated
as followed:

a) Critically review the current Chinese maritime surveillance system;
b) Provide an applicable solution;
c) Conduct a feasibility analysis of the solution to facilitate the MS system
improvement;
d) Draw attention to those concerned and provide constructive suggestions to the
decision maker(s).

4

1.3 Methodology
In order to fully meet the objectives, several methods have been used in subsequent
sections:

1. Literature Review:
A large amount of literatures, including IMO documents, relevant conventions,
research papers, books and articles, which are mainly from archive of IMO, Google
Scholar, CNKI3 and libraries, have been reviewed, so as to gain a wholly picture of
current Chinese MS system, its component systems and alternative technologies, to
better support the research.

2. Qualitative Analysis 4
To better delve into objectives mentioned and convey a more objective conclusion
afterward, a qualitative analysis (Corbin and Strauss, 2014, p11), which mainly
includes semi-structured interview (face to face and telephone) with current
employed MSA staff, have been conducted. The findings will be used as the basis for
further researches.

3. Theoretical Analysis:
In final part, a theoretical analysis will be carried out to analyze the proposed
solution to the problems discovered, in term of not only the technical but also legal
and practical aspects. To better strengthen the feasibility of the recommended
solution, as one of the technology project members in the MSA, relevant analysis
will be provided by the author therewith.

3
4

CNKI: Google Scholar’s Chinese counterpart
Qualitative analysis mainly takes the form of semi-structured interview
5

1.4 Structure of the Paper
The research paper is mainly comprised of six chapters: Chapter one provides
background information, research objectives and methodologies to be used in
subsequent parts; Chapter two broadly reviews the current Chinese maritime
surveillance system, including its various component subsystems, their advantages
and shortcomings will also be discussed respectively; Chapter three mainly focuses
on analyzing the effectiveness and efficiency of the maritime surveillance system
reviewed, a qualitative method will be conducted to further strengthen the objective
conclusions; Chapter four offers an applicable and practicable solution, by
comparing with different improvement measures, to enhance the effectiveness of
Chinese maritime surveillance system, based on the conclusions obtained in previous
chapters; Chapter five primarily analyzes the necessity and content of the
recommended solution, relative analysis and data will be provided to further
reinforce the argument; Chapter six makes final summary and conclusion, highlights
and limitations of this research paper and implications for further researches also
have been outlined.

6

CHAPTER 2
CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT CHINESE MARITIME
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM
2.1

Introduction

Over the past four decades, the gradual establishment of China maritime surveillance
system and advanced technologies are offering a staunch of foundation in
guaranteeing maritime safety, protection and preservation of environment within
Chinese coastal regions (Song, 2010; Cai, 2011b; Zhao, 2012; Zhang, 2015a).
However, as the rapid maritime development (especially the shipping) in China and
the west-Pacific region, pressures for MSA to ensure safety at sea and protection of
environment has been rising substantially, the Chinese maritime surveillance (MS)
system, which consists of different subsystems, plays an irreplaceable role in that
regard. Therefore, in this chapter, the author will introduce the overall picture of
current Chinese MS system and paves the way for subsequent researches, so as to
overhaul and improve effectiveness of Chinese MS system.

2.2

Chinese Maritime Surveillance System

After years of efforts made by China MSA, the MS system is comprised of VTS, AIS,
CCTV, SAR, SAT-AIS, LRIT, GPS, COMPASS and manned vehicle patrol
subsystems (Song, 2010; Zhao, 2012), the following sub-paragraphs will introduce
each component, their functions and effectiveness.

7

2.2.1

Vessel Traffic System (VTS)

The effectiveness and significance of Vessel Traffic System (VTS), which is
mandated by the IMO (IMO, 1997), have long been recognized as a useful measure
(Lin, 2006; Kao, et al, 2007; Maresca, et l, 2015). As one of the major player in
global community, China has been paying great emphasis on the VTS development.
Since the establishment of first VTS at Ningbo in 1982 (Hu and Yang, 2008),
Chinese VTS has been undergoing a rapid development. To date, total 57 VTS
centers and 266 radar towers are currently under operation, which include costal (41
VTS centers and 180 radar towers) and inner-water (16 VTS centers and 86 radar
towers) (Figure 2.1), and total monitor coverage area is estimated 90,000 square
kilometer (TPRT, 2015), basically covering all key areas in China.

Figure.2.1 The Distribution of Chinese VTS centers (Source: TPRT, 2014)
According to Xi (2013) , the number of Chinese VTS centers and radar-towers, of
which technical standards have reached international-level, account for one third of
the world, and monitor coverage area is the world largest. In 2014, China VTS
tracked and monitored approximate 3.5 million voyages, intercepted, corrected and
handled more than 40,000 illegal traffic behaviors and provided at least 5 million
8

navigation information services (Figure 2.2). The statistic from Hu and Yang (2008)
also fortify the argument: along with 20% annual growth of vessel traffic flow in
China, the accident rate in the VTS coverage has dropped remarkably 70%. Hence,
Chinese VTS system plays a vital role in ensuring maritime safety, improving traffic
efficiency and protecting marine environment, which in turn created enormous
economic, social and ecological benefits (Zhu and Chen, 2008).

Figure 2.2 Chinese VTS display (Screenshot taken on VTS center)
However, the shore-based VTS, which usually located in harbors or channel entries,
has been questioned by many (Kao et al, 2007; Xi, 2013; Maresca, 2015; Zhang,
2015a) as lack of effectiveness in maritime surveillance. Firstly, according to Kao et
al (2007), due to technical characteristics of radar, theoretical range is 20nm (but not
likely in many cases), that is to say VTS monitor range is highly restricted.
Additionally, current VTS does not have enough technical capability to monitor
crowded route areas to maintain maritime safety, because overcrowded vessels might
interfere VTS operators and reduce effectiveness of ship monitoring (Praetorius,
2012). Furthermore, the backscattered signal is strongly affected by sea states
(Maresca, 2015), for example currents can negatively affect radar detection
capabilities, especially at the estuaries regions (i.e., Yangtze & Pearl River), which in
turn significantly lower its monitoring capability. Fourthly, the rapid development of
9

coastal regions in China also plays a negative role in affecting VTS performance, the
report of Shenzhen MSA (2015a) indicates the harbor cranes and other
infrastructures could block radar signals and create man-made “blind zone”. Finally,
information acquired by radar is limited, for instance VTS cannot effectively monitor
small vessels (i.e., difficult to identify vessel type and size), neither can it distinguish
ships (i.e., name, type and cargo) by radar alone (Cai, 2011b). Also, in the absence of
automatic information judging system, VTS mainly relies on human to carry out
surveillance duties, which is neither effective nor efficient (Xi, 2013; Zhang, 2015a).
2.2.2

Automatic Identification System (AIS)

Since the installation of AIS onboard, which originally designed for maritime safety
and collision avoidance between vessels (Iervolino et al, 2015), became a mandatory
requirement for relevant ships (IMO, 2000), China MSA has initiated the shore-based
AIS network construction. Up to 2013，China invested more than 500 million RMB
in establishing AIS: one national center, 7 regional and 32 branch-level AIS centers
have been set up, managing 121 coast-based and 143 inner-water AIS stations (Liang,
et al, 2013), of which covering all coastal regions and most main rivers (coverage
rate up to 99.97% and signal usable rate up to 99.95%; Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3 Chinese shore based AIS Coverage (Source: TPRT, 2014)
10

The AIS, which consists of shipboard AIS and shore-based station (Liu, and Dong,
2010), can be used to actively monitor ships’ status, namely ship's name, IMO
number, position, velocity, direction and voyage status by MSA (Figure 2.4).

Figure 2.4 Chinese AIS information system screenshot (taken by author on 11th May)
In addition, the GPS, VHF and SOTDMA techniques dependent system (AIS) has
been playing an important role in ensuring maritime safety, traffic control and
supporting maritime governance for the following reasons:

Firstly, signal acquired by AIS is instant and relatively accurate, that is to say AIS is
a real-time and reliable maritime monitoring system which is crucial for maritime
governance. (Wang, 2011)

Furthermore, because of the characteristic of VHF communication, there is almost no
“blind zone” in AIS coverage areas, also anti-jamming capability is superior, which
can guarantee signal stability especially in severe weathers condition. (Cai, 2011a)

Finally, AIS can provide excellent monitoring performance in a cost-benefit manner,
due to the remote control characteristic: one AIS control center can remotely control
various AIS shore based stations and cover vast areas (Figure 2.5).
11

Figure 2.5 Chinese AIS system working principle (source: edited by the author)
As a complementary measure, AIS does improve maritime safety by complementing
functions with existing VTS. However, after a couple of years in practice, certain
deficiencies have been revealed:

First and foremost, due to the earth curvature AIS coverage, which is very dependent
on antenna height, ambient radio noise and troposphere factors. (Lessing et al, 2006),
is only 40km (Iervolino et al, 2015; Peng, 2015), that means the monitoring range of
AIS is also restricted (Burzigotti et al, 2010), which is hard to meet the requirements
of large-scale and long-range maritime surveillance (Liang et al, 2013).

Secondly, as a passive system (Wang and Wang, 2011), AIS can only detect the
AIS-equipped ships or “cooperative vessels”, which operate AIS correctly (Frazer et
al, 2010). In addition, problems of AIS falsification emerge, which masks illegal
transport and lead to disturbances of MS system and increasing associated maritime
risks (Ray et al, 2015): some fishing vessels are practicing this offense to fish
illegally by pretending to be yachts; many ships turn off AIS to escape from AIS
monitoring, in order to carrying undeclared dangerous cargos (Harati-Mokhtari et al,
2007).
12

Finally, some technical issues affect the effectiveness of AIS, especially in crowded
areas: 1) as Zhang (2015a) claims, there might be overflow of AIS information and
conflict of message in overcrowded ports, which might lead to AIS packet loss (no
display of vessels); 2) the VHF frequency based AIS might impair the capacity of
neighboring vessels’ equipments to receive and broadcast AIS message from/to
distant designates (Ray et al, 2015), thus inter-channel interference phenomenon,
which could totally block emitted or received AIS message and limit AIS service
range, is specially serious in congestive areas.

In sum, the main drawbacks concerning land-based AIS systems are limited spatial
coverage, impossibility of berth to berth tracking (Iervolino et al, 2015), and
possibility of information falsification.
2.2.3

Close Circuit Television System (CCTV)

Visual surveillance (CCTV) in the maritime filed has been explored for long time
(Fefilatyev et al, 2012), however, substantial application of CCTV system in China
just began in 2011 (Hao et al, 2014), under the name of “intelligent maritime”. After
5 years of experiments, a comprehensive CCTV system has been established (Figure
2.6), to effectively monitor inner water channels and key coastal ports (Tao, 2011).

Figure 2.6 CCTV System Structure (Source: edited base on MSA internal source)
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The system (CCTV) can achieve effective real-time visual monitoring (Figure 2.7),
without the need to require additional equipments, to correct illegal activities (i.e.,
cargo overloaded, irregular mooring and navigational rules violation) and reduce
accident rates (i.e., prevents dangerous situations from developing to accidents)
happened in monitored areas. CCTV system facilitates the maritime surveillance and
overall governance (by obtaining real-time situations), at the meantime effectively
lower administration cost (i.e., reduce the number of vessels dispatch). (Wang, 2011)

In sum, the CCTV system’s advantages could be summarized: 1) CCTV can
effectively reduce administration cost (including human and equipment), by remote
sensing and control; 2) the directness and uninterrupted characteristics of CCTV can
achieve a real-time traffic monitoring; 3) the record and replay function of CCTV
provides a powerful tool for MSA to prosecute those suspects involved in maritime
casualties and regulation violation (Hao et al, 2014).

Figure 2.7 Chinese CCTV display screenshots (source: Chinese CCTV system)
Contrarily, the drawbacks of CCTV system are showed in following:
14

Firstly, CCTV system’s surveillance capability is highly affected by visibility
condition, i.e., fog, night time (Wang, 2011), and infrastructures in front of the
cameras, like the examples showed in Figure 2.7.

Secondly, the surveillance range of CCTV system is also highly restricted (Wang,
2010), according to Shenzhen MSA (2015b), the most advanced CCTV can only
obtain distinguishable images from 2km away in fine weather. Therefore, CCTV
monitoring system would only be limited to port areas (Fefilatyev et al, 2012) and
cannot monitor situations far beyond the shores.

Thirdly, CCTV system can experience difficulties in detecting a vessel’s real
situation when a vessel is moving toward cameras (Figure 2.8) or is anchored off the
coast due to small amount of inter-frame changes (Bloisi et al, 2015), which in term
lowers the effectiveness of CCTV system and might generate new maritime risks.

Figure 2.8 Visual and VTS data projection. (Source: Bloisi et al, 2015)
2.2.4 Long Range Maritime Surveillance System
Apart from the short-range coast-based MS systems discussed, MSA has been
conducting numerous trials and established pioneering programs to promote
15

long-range MS capability, so as to establish MDA system (Sun, 2015) to better
enhance maritime safety, security and protection of environment. In subsequent parts,
the paper will introduce techniques within the Chinese MS System domain:
2.2.4.1 Long Range Identification and Tracking of Ships System (LRIT)
Proposed by United State after 9/11, Long Range Identification and Tracking of
ships system had been made mandatory by amending Chapter V of SOLAS in 2006
(IMO, 2006) and entered into force in 2009, so as to reinforce maritime security,
safety and search and rescue in a global aspect (IMO, 2008a; IMO, 2008b).

The LRIT system consists of already installed ship-borne satellite communications
equipments, communications service providers (CSPs), application service providers
(ASPs), LRIT data centers, LRIT data distribution plan and International LRIT data
exchange (Figure 2.9). The performance of LRIT system are reviewed by LRIT
coordinator acting on behalf of IMO and contracting States (CTTI, 2015a): wherever
the vessel, the flag State is entitled to acquire vessel’s LRIT information; if the vessel
want to enter coastal States or port States, relevant authorities are also entitled to
acquired information from data exchange center (IMO, 2008a), disregard of its
position (even the vessel is 1000nm away).

According to requirements of SOLAS, China has established LRIT system which
consists of data center, back-up center, application terminals (Figure 2.10) (Du,
2010). Most of the LRIT communications are based on INMARSAT-C (Zhang and
Bao, 2007), and display of current China LRIT system is illustrated in figure 2.11.
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Figure 2.9 Configuration of LRIT system (Source: http://www.shipmates.in/)

Figure 2.10 Chinese LRIT system structure (Source: China MSA, 2010)

Figure 2.11 Chinese LRIT system display (Source; China MSA internal report5)
According to Du (2010) and CTTI (2015b), Chinese LRIT system plays a role in the
following aspects: 1) enhance maritime safety and security in coastal regions, by

5

Due to the limited usage of LRIT, the author acquire the Chinese LRIT display from one internal source
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remotely tracking irregular and suspicious vessels; 2) improve maritime search and
rescue effectiveness, by providing information support, i.e., distress vessel’s position
and time; 3) promote environmental protection, by providing auxiliary information
supports (past ships in specific region during specific timeframe) to essentially tackle
illegal oil/sewage discharges and oil-spills; 4) complement existing MS system, by
making the monitoring operations more effective; 5) Provide additional information
supports for Custom and Sanitary Quarantine department for other purposes.

Although LRIT has been recognized as a useful measure6 which can complement the
combination of VTS and AIS in term of long-range maritime surveillance and
large-scale ships monitoring, shortcomings of LRIT are also apparent: 1) LRIT can
only acquire data from certain types of ships, vessels below 300GT will not be
revealed in LRIT monitor display, thus large amount of vessels are out of reach (Du,
2010); 2) the information, which only contains ship identity, position and time,
acquired by LRIT is very limited, therefore the detection and tracking capabilities are
also restricted (Zhang, 2015a); 3) the time gap of the information intermittence is
large (6 hours), which indicates potential risks during the period.
2.2.4.2 Satellite Based Automatic Identification System (Sat-AIS)
There are estimated 70,000 ships installed with AIS globally (Peng et al, 2015),
combining with much larger amount of small vessels operating in different areas. The
vast number of vessels and coverage limitation of shore-based AIS (Brusch et al,
2011) had prompted the demand for wider range AIS coverage (Liang, et al, 2013).
In 2001, the idea of using near-earth-satellites（orbital altitude less than 1000km）as
repeaters to increase AIS coverage was proposed by USCG, and the concept had

6

Useful measure in term of maritime security
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gradually became the nowadays Sat-AIS (Figure 2.12) which can monitor vessels in
a wide range of areas in a real-time manner (Hannevik et al, 2010).

Although China’s startup was relatively late, yet as of 2015, a functioning Sat-AIS
system, which has 1 command center, 1 data back-up center, 3 regional centers and
14 branch-level centers, has been established (Zhang, 2015a) and effectively
complemented the MS system (Figure 2.13).

First of all, wide-range coverage (about 20 million square kilometers (Iervolino et al,
2015)) and excellent information capability (maximum simultaneously handle 6,200
vessels signals) to track vessels from berth to berth are the main advantages that
distinguish Sat-AIS from other MS measures (Peng et al, 2015). Moreover, Sat-AIS
can receive signals from as far as Polar Regions, vastly extend the MS capability
without geographical restrictions. Finally, Sat-AIS features the availability of all
instant information contained in actual AIS signals as transmitted by vessels,
providing a reliable and extensive information data on all parameters with respect to
individual vessels. This enables a convenient and effective way of analyzing
maritime traffic in certain areas of interest.

Also, an increase in the number of detected vessels per-area will lead to augment in
the number of situations where Sat-AIS would be applicable, i.e., harbor traffic
planning, search and rescue, vessel tracking, detection of illegal transports and
maritime casualty investigation, combined with other data like SAR imagery (Brusch
et al, 2011), which will be introduced in the next section.
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Figure 2.12 Sat-AIS working principle (Source: www.portvision.com)

Figure 2.13 Sat-AIS coverage in Far-east Asia
(Source: https://www.fleetmon.com/global-vessel-coverage/7)
Even though Sat-AIS makes up disadvantages of shore-based AIS, the system is far
from perfect: above all, the passive characteristic of Sat-AIS is the same with
shore-based AIS, which

means Sat-AIS

cannot detect and

track those

“non-compliance”; second, the real-time of maritime surveillance cannot be
guaranteed by Sat-AIS, because of the way of satellite orbits work (Zhang, 2015b);
furthermore, even within satellite coverage range, the effect of Doppler and
problems of signal conflict in different zones pose challenges to the real application
of Sat-AIS (Peng, 2015); lastly, China does not has AIS receiver-equipped satellite,
that is to say the fees to use Sat-AIS is extremely high (Zhang, 2015a).
7

The AIS data are obtained from commercial AIS display website
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2.2.4.3 Synthetic Aperture Radar System (SAR)
As one of the traditional surveillance measures, Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) has
been applied in various fields, i.e., landscape mapping, military reconnaissance and
maritime surveillance (Crisp, 2004). In recent years, SAR (Figure 2.14) provides an
alternative surveillance solution to maritime administration (Tello et al, 2005),
allowing the maritime surveillance of broad expanses, independently from
meteorological condition, national boarder and from the day and night cycle.

Figure 2.14 Working principle of SAR (Source: http://www.geo.uzh.ch/)
Although China MSA conducted experimental SAR trials in recent years (Sun, 2015),
no comprehensive SAR system has been developed, due to the high false alarm rate
(i.e., disturbances from current; Tello et al, 2005) and maritime surveillance
requirements (Bloisi et al, 2015). But China MSA still possesses maritime aircrafts to
carry out SAR surveillance missions for following reasons:

Firstly according to Iervolino et al (2015), SAR is effective in detecting
non-cooperative vessels and tracking of small vessels without AIS (Figure 2.15).
Modern SAR provides wide spatial coverage, consequently, a better control of
open-sea regions. Secondly, as Hannevik et al (2010) pointed out, SAR combined
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with Sat-AIS would be suitable for monitoring remote regions. AIS identify vessels
detected in SAR, and SAR can detect vessels not reporting through AIS. The
combination enables authority to unveil non-cooperative vessels. Finally, using SAR
to detect and monitor oil spills under most-weather conditions (Figure 2.16) have
been an applicable option for MSA (Shirvany et al, 2012).

Figure 2.15 SAR complements with AIS surveillance (Source: Brusch et al, 2011)

Figure 2.16 Oil-slick Property Type Recognition in SAR image.
(Source: Shirvany et al, 2012)
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2.2.5 Navigation System
The main measures of Chinese MS system are briefly discussed, and many of the
techniques, namely AIS, LRIT and Sat-AIS, are based on satellite-based navigation
systems, like American initiated Global Positioning System (GPS) and Chinese
launched COMPASS (Beidou) navigation system (Figure 2.17). This part will
introduce navigation systems which are already incorporated into the MS system.

Figure 2.17 Comparison of Different Space based Navigation System
Source:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Comparison_satellite_navigation_orbits.svg
2.2.5.1 Global Positioning System (GPS)
GPS, which was first launched in 1978 and currently has total 31 satellites in
operation (USCG, 2016), is the most popular and mature navigation system, which
providing global coverage, high precision (5 meter) and freely accessibility to
anyone with a GPS receiver (Zhang, 2015a). Along with the navigational purpose,
GPS also provides an effective mean to track and monitor vessels which are out of
the range of existing shore-based surveillance system. China MSA has long
recognized the benefits of applying GPS into MS system (i.e., all maritime patrol
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vehicles and aircrafts are equipped with GPS), which effectively expand the monitor
range. However, there is a growing recognition in Chinese maritime field (Kang and
Quan, 2013) that GPS alone cannot provide robust positioning and reliable
surveillance service for maritime industry. Therefore, China had begun to set up its
own navigation system since this new millennium8.
2.2.5.2 Beidou Navigation Satellite System (BDS)
Beidou Navigation Satellite System (formerly known as COMPASS) was an
independent Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) developed by China. The
BDS, which the first satellite was launched in 2000, has a three-phase development
strategy namely, 2000-2007: experimental; 2007-2012 regional coverage; 2012-2020
global coverage (Kang and Quan, 2013). Current BDS (precision is about 10 meter)
satellites are illustrated in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Summary of Beidou Satellites (As of 2015)
Satellite launches
Launch
Block
Currently in orbit
Period
Success Failure Planned
1

2000–2007

4

0

0

0

2

2007-2012

16

0

0

14

3

From 2015

6

0

18

6

Total

26

0

18

20

Source: www.beidou.org.cn

8

See more from www.beidou.gov.cn
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Figure 2.18 BDS service coverage area (Source: www.beidou.org.cn)
The current BDS became operational in China in December 2011, with 10 satellites
in operation, offering services to customers in Asia-Pacific region since December
2012 (Figure 2.18). BDS is now under construction to move toward the final phase,
which will be a global navigation system consisting of 35 satellites (5 Geostationary
Earth Orbit Satellites (GEO), 30 Median Earth Orbit Satellites (MEO) and Inclined
Geosynchronous Satellite Orbit (IGSO); Wang and Wang, 2011) as of May 2016.
(See more from Appendix A)

The BDS plays a more and more important role in Chinese MS system, search and
rescue, maritime casualty investigation and fishery monitoring, ad hoc, the
application of BDS can reinforce the maritime safety in channels and vessel routes
(Figure 2.19), in the absence of GPS (i.e., positioning error). In 2014, BDS has been
recognized by IMO and being taken into GNSS (UN recognized maritime satellite
navigation system; Zhang, 2015a).
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Figure 2.19 Application of BDS in ship monitoring (source www.cnssjz.org)
In service areas, BDS can provide geographical information, two-way short message
and precise timing service. Combing with other surveillance measures, BDS can
remedy some of the deficiencies of other MS system, especially in remote regions
(Wang and Wang, 2011): 1) BDS can improve the whole reliability of the Chinese
maritime surveillance, by adding sufficient abundance (in case of GPS equipments
malfunction); 2) BDS terminals have positioning and communication functions,
which are ideal for vessels monitoring in high seas.
2.2.6 Manned Maritime Patrol System
The final kind of maritime surveillance mean introduced is Manned Maritime Patrol
System, which is the main measure for maritime law enforcement, emergency
respond and search and rescue. The current Maritime Patrol System is primarily
comprised of two parts, namely Maritime Patrol Vessel System (MPV) and Manned
Maritime Patrol Aircraft system (MPA).
2.2.6.1 Maritime Patrol Vessel System (MPV)
Chinese Maritime Patrol Vessel System is consisted of various kinds of maritime

26

patrol vessels which main missions include maritime monitoring, daily patrol to
enforce relevant laws and emergency responses. To date, China MSA has up to 370
different kinds of patrol vessels (Table 2.2) which operate in coastal regions, harbor
and inner waters

Table 2.2 Summary of Existing Chinese Maritime Patrol Vessels
Ship Type
100/80 meter MPV

Navigating Area
High Sea

Applicable Water
Number
Open Sea Area
6
Areas 50nm From
60 meter MPV
Greater Coastal Area
24
Shore
Key Channels, Water
40 meter MPV
Coastal Sea
59
ways and Islands
Harbor and Adjacent
30/20 meter MPV
Shelter Area
281
Areas
Source: Compiled by the author based on the information from (China MSA, 2011a).
Presently, as the main measure to directly carry out law enforcement by MSA, the
MPV system is regarded as an effective outreach of existing MS system, ensuring the
maritime safety and protection of environment.

Deficiencies of MPV system are, however, obvious. Disadvantages could be
categorized as 4 kinds: 1) restricted operation range, as showed in Table 2.2, most
vessels are small boats which can only voyage in shelter areas; 2) limited
surveillance capacity due to characteristics of ships and weather dependence (i.e.,
severe weather, fog); 3) slow reaction to emergencies, because of long startup time
and low speed (maximum 20 knot); 4) high maintenance cost (Wang, 2010),
according to MSA statistics, one 100 meter-level patrol ships costs at least 15million
RMB (2.3 million USD) annually, which is expensive in term of per-ship region.
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2.2.6.2Manned Maritime Patrol Aircraft System (MPA)
Apart from MPV system, MPA system, which was started in 2000 and mainly
comprised of surveillance aircrafts and maritime helicopters, has been developing
rapidly. In 2014, there are 2 aircraft bases with 2 fix-planes and total 15 helicopter
base with 28 maritime helicopters for China MSA (Figure 2.20; China MSA, 2011a).

MPA system overcomes many shortcomings of MPV, by providing a wide range of
surveillance, in terms of navigating (100-500 km) and monitoring range (12 times the
size of MPV) (Liu et al, 2014) and readily emergency response capability (90-300
km/h), to enhance maritime safety and ensure environmental protection.

Figure 2.20 Distribution of Chinese MPA system (Source: TPRT, 2014)
But similar with MPV system, drawbacks of MPA system are noticeable: 1) MPA’s
operations are also largely effected by weather conditions, for instance MPA cannot
carry out daily duties in heavy weathers unless in extreme circumstance; 2) the
long-winded

procedures

(startup)

for

flight

permission

counteracts

the

expeditiousness of MPA; 3) The risks (i.e., human and property) associated with
MPA operations are relatively high; 4) The costs for retaining flight crew and
maintenance are extremely high.
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2.3

Summary of Applied Maritime Surveillance Measures for China MSA

The maritime surveillance measures applied by China MSA have been briefly
introduced, different system has its own advantages and disadvantages, which plays
its own unique role in enhancing maritime safety, security and protection of the
environment. In order to give a whole picture of the applied maritime surveillance
measures for China MSA in a clear and concise manner, the author compiled the
Table 2.3, to further facilitate the research afterward.
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Table 2.3 Summary of existing maritime surveillance techniques for China MSA (Source: Made by the author)
Technique

VTS

AIS

General Situation in China MSA
1.Total 57 VTS centers and 266 radar
towers: costal region (41 VTS centers and
180 radar towers) and inner water (16 VTS
centers and 86 radar towers)
2. Monitor coverage: about 90,000 square
kilometer
1.1 national, 7 regional and 32 branch AIS
centers: 121 coast-based AIS stations and
143 inner-water AIS stations;
2. Monitor coverage: all Chinese coastal
regions and most main rivers;
(Coverage rate 99.97% and signal usable
rate 99.95%)

Advantages
1. Real-time radar surveillance;
2. All weather & 24/7 surveillance
capability;
3. Track and monitor all vessels
basically in radar coverage areas;
1.Instant surveillance capability;
2.All weather & 24/7 surveillance
capability;
3. Track and monitor all vessels in
network coverage areas;
4.Accquired information sufficient;
5. Cost-effective

CCTV

1. 1 national command center and 14
1.Visual and direct monitor
regional center
capability;
2. Monitor coverage: key areas in key 2. Cost effective in term of
ports, channels and inner waterways
maritime surveillance

LRIT

1. 1 national center and 2 regional center,
one data and back-up centers
2. Monitor coverage: all seas administrated
by China MSA

1. Long range detect and monitor
capability;
2. Complement existing systems;
3. Provide additional information
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Disadvantages
1. Limited coverage range (20nm)
2.Low effectiveness in crowded
port areas;
3.High false information rate;
4. man-made “blind zone” ;
5. Acquired data is limited
1. Limited coverage range (40nm)
2.Passive surveillance measure;
3.Possibility of data falsification;
4.Difficult to monitor in the
congested water areas
5.Signal interference might create
new maritime risks
1.Limited monitor range (1nm);
2. Easily affected by weather;
3. Image can easily be blocked
4.Diffuclt to monitor certain kinds
of vessels
1. Data and information is
limited;
2. Applied vessels are restricted;
3. Intermittent gap is too wide

Technique

General Situation in China MSA

Advantages

Disadvantages

1.Passive surveillance measure;
1. 1 national and 2 regional centers, 1 data
2. Not real-time surveillance;
1. Long-range & large-scale vessel
and back-up centers (similar with LRIT);
3. Affected by Doppler effects
Sat-AIS
detection and tracking capability;
2. Monitor coverage: all seas administrated
and satellite orbit work;
2.Near-real-time surveillance;
by China MSA
4. Difficult to track in busy waters
5.High associated cost
1. Not real time surveillance;
1.Large-scale vessel detection 2. Difficult to distinguish (image)
No comprehensive system has been
SAR Radar
capability;
in some cases
established by China MSA
2.Complement with other measures 3.High cost for deploying
aircrafts
GPS

1. American navigation system;
2. Service coverage: global

1. 1 national center and 3 regional center:
COMPASS/
37 coastal aid stations;
BEIDOU
2. Service coverage: Asia-pacific
MPV

1.4 different kinds of total 370 MPVs;
2. Coverage: mainly in port areas

MPA

1.2 different kinds of total 30 MPAs;
2. Coverage: mainly in coastal areas

1. Global coverage;
2 Reliable and mature technique
1.Reinforce signal coverage in
Asia-Pacific region;
2.Independent technology
1.Traditional maritime surveillance
measure;
2. law-enforcement measure
1. Long-range coverage;
2. Expeditiousness
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1. Foreign reliant technology;;
2. Inaccurate data in some regions
1. Not global coverage;
2.Not reliable and mature enough
1.Limited coverage ranges
2. Slow reaction time;
3. High maintenance cost
1.Prolonged procedures
2.High associated risks
3. High maintenance cost

2.4

Chapter Summary

Maritime Surveillance systems for the maritime domains (safety, security and
protection of environment) are becoming more important in recent years along with
rapid development of global maritime transport industry. Therefore, as discussed in
previous sections in this chapter, China MSA has established a functional maritime
surveillance system, to detect and track the vessels enter and leave Chinese coastal
regions, by various kinds of monitoring measures, which have their own advantages
and disadvantages. In order to carry out effective maritime surveillance, the
combination of systems have been applied by China MSA, for instance, VTS
combine with AIS, are often equipped with long-range CCTV system (Bloisi et al,
2015). However, the available techniques can only provide limited support to the MS
system which is not sufficient to ensure a practical and effective solution for
maritime surveillance challenges ahead (more details will be introduced in following
chapters).
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CHAPTER 3
ANALYSIS OF EXISTING CHINESE MARITIME SURVEILLANCE
SYSTEM’S CHALLENGES
3.1

Introduction

During the past decades, systematic Chinese maritime surveillance system has
gradually been set up to cover coastal regions and inner waterways, ensuring the safe,
security and integrity of marine environment. However, current system is far from
faultless: no single surveillance measure can provide the real-time consolidated
maritime surveillance capability, neither the combination of different monitor
techniques can offer an effective and cost-effective solution to form a overall MS
system. The requirements of proposed MS system are summarized by Guerriero et al
(2008), including three substantial components: a) multi-sensor signal and
information processing generates contact-level data for available sensors; b)
large-scale multi-senor data fusion and tracking which is capable of processing
vessels tracks and contact-level or track level data from various surveillance source
to produce a consolidated surveillance picture; c) anomaly (irregularity) detection
capability that significantly increase the efficiency of MS system, to further improve
the effectiveness of Chinese maritime surveillance and promote the maritime
governance. Therefore, in order for China MSA to move towards real-time
consolidated maritime surveillance, existing problems and potential challenges
should be dealt with careful investigations and in-depth analysis. In this chapter, the
paper tried to discover problems and provided thoughts for further research.
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3.2

Overview of Chinese Maritime Surveillance System’s Role
3.2.1 Relationship Between Maritime Accidents and Chinese MS System

In last 10 years (2005-1014), major maritime casualties in China have been
significantly reduced, thanks to the combination efforts of maritime technology
advancement, seafarers training and relevant maritime safety measures, among those,
maritime surveillance system is credited as the crucial factor which lead to the
continuous drop of maritime casualties. Table 3.1 and figure 3.1 have proved high
negative correlation (R² = 0.9461) between maritime casualty and MS system (which
capability is simplified by annual financial input), and indicate MSA should continue
to invest greatly into the system to promote capabilities of MS system, and further
prevent maritime casualties from happening.
Table 3.1 Statistics of Number of Accident and Budgets for Chinese MS system
(Source: Compiled by author based on statistics from China MSA)
Year

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Number of
Maritime
Casualties

532

440

420

342

358

327

298

279

261

255

Budget for MS
system
(million RMB)

1510

1730

1780

1830

1970

2060

2110

2130

2180

2220

Regression analysis of number of accident and China MSA annual budget
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3.2.2 Relationship Between Port Throughput and Chinese MS System
During the same period, the drastic increase of port throughput in China has also
been attributed to the gradual modernization of Chinese MS system which effectively
guarantees the safe and rapid development of Chinese maritime industry (ports,
shipping lines and related industries). Table 3.2 and figure 3.2 reinforces the above
statements and prove the high positive correlation (R² = 0.9213) between Chinese
main ports throughput and Chinese MS system development.

Table 3.2 Statistics of Main Ports Throughput and Budgets for Chinese MS system
(Source: Compiled by author based on statistics from China MSA)
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Main Ports
Throughput
(billion ton)

2.93

3.42

3.88

4.30

4.75

5.48

6.16

6.65

7.28

7.69

Maritime
Budget for
MS system
(billion
RMB)

1.51

1.73

1.78

1.83

1.97

2.06

2.11

2.13

2.18

2.22

Regression analyses of main ports throughput and China MSA budget9

9

The reviews indicate MS system is highly positively related to maritime safety and maritime industry
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Flowing from the above analysis, it could be concluded that Chinese MS System
does have a significant role in improving maritime safety in China, thus the Chinese
MSA should continue to engage in modernizing the current MS system.
3.3

Qualitative Study of the Chinese Maritime Surveillance System

As noted from Chapter 2, Chinese MS System is far from perfect, in order to
improve its performance and effectiveness, more researches are required. Therefore,
a qualitative research method, which includes discovering problems from people’s
perspective (Caelli et al, 2003), is utilized to enquire information about the current
Chinese MS system performance and find out associated problems and challenges.
3.3.1 The Method for the Qualitative Research
A semi-structured interview was designed for the qualitative research, thanks to the
characteristics of the semi-structured interview which allows the author to have a
degree of control over responses of interviewees during the processes. Also,
considering the chosen interviewees are working at different positions in different
China MSA departments and the current location (Dalian) of the author,
semi-structured interviews mostly took the combined form of face-to-face and
telephone interview to perform an investigation.
3.3.2 Procedures and Participants Sampling
In the semi-structured interviews, to better know and compare the cognition of
different MSA staff about MS system, 6 members are selected from management
level, while the others have been chosen from the frontline staff randomly (detailed
information please view Appendix B), subsequently 12 interviews were conducted, 5
out of which were face-to face interviews and 7 were telephone interview. Two days
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prior to interviews, the interviewees were given an overview of a list of questions,
which is prepared in advance (for full version, please see Appendix C), to be
informed about the objectives of the research. After gaining permission from
interviewees, the interviews were recorded for accurately collecting the required data.
One sample interview transcripts can be seen in Appendix D.
3.3.3 Results
The information obtained from the Semi-structured interviews could be broadly
categorized into following categories:
3.3.3.1 Data Source
The general performance of Chinese MS system has been confirmed by most of the
participants, however, all the interviewees have expressed concerns, like interviewee
A, C and F:

‘Although we have a nominal comprehensive MS system, the sub-systems are usually
seperated and the information obtained cannot be effectively utilized, therefore the
system is not effective as it may seem’. (A)
‘We have so many VTS centers and AIS stations along the coasts, however, when
something odd happen offshore, we still cannot rely on the system as there is no
cross-checking mechanism’. (C)
‘We can only rely on what we have here, if something (accident) happens beyond the
reach of the system, for example AIS, we can do nothing about it. LRIT and Sat-AIS
are just too distant (and expensive) for us to use’. (F)

The information provided reveals that the Chinese MS system lacks of data fusion
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system, cross-checking mechanism and down-to-frontline implementation of new
techniques, which are also stressed in 2.2.4.1 and 2.2.4.2.
3.3.3.2 Accuracy
According to the interviews, the accuracy of vessels detection, tracking and
monitoring has been emphasized by many participants, for instance interviewee B
and F have said:

‘The problem I encounter the most as a VTS operator here is the inaccuracy of the
monitor data, which sometimes cannot tell the really position or the ship type, even I
use AIS as complementary tool (which is also not really reliable). Without the
accurate data, it is hard for me to carry out the daily duty’. (B)
‘False alarm is concerned, because the (MS) system is not really reliable, for
instance the currents or small floating objects might easily be recognized as vessels
by the VTS radar, sometimes is difficult for us to discern especially in busy
water’ .(F)

The above statements coincide with the disadvantages presented in 2.2.1 and 2.2.3,
which indicate the accuracy of the acquired data needed to be adjusted.
3.3.3.3 Readiness
During the interviews, frustrations have been expressed by the participants in regard
to the readiness of existing system, as interviewees E, F and I have stressed:

‘In case of emergency, the current mean we can use is the maritime patrol ship,
which is too slow in reaction and speed, it is too late for everything sometimes!’ (E)
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‘The problem bothers me the most is the evidence gathering for illegal discharge of
vessel-source pollutants, the existing means are either no use or too slow, many times
we can only watch pollutions happening without arresting those responsible’.(F)
‘We can only rely on human power and patrol ships to tackle those illegal transports
and sand dredging, which are not effective and adding a lot of burdens onto us’. (I)

The arguments presented by these participants have also reinforced the statements
introduced in the 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.6.1, which reveal the needs for Chinese MS
system to actively improve its overall readiness.
3.3.3.4 Falsifying Data
The other problem raised by the participants is the current system does not have an
effective way to counter falsifying data, as participant D and G stated:

‘It is extremely hard to prosecute those suspects (in cases of oil pollution) unless we
can catch them at scene, because they will usually operate beyond the system’s
monitoring range and falsifying AIS data’. (D)
‘Without doubts, the most difficult things in managing maritime safety at sea is those
fishing boats and sands-gravel ships, which don’t have AIS or intentionally switch-off
their AIS in order to escape our monitor, we don’t have so many resources to verify
the overall situation in our jurisdiction’. (G)

The problem, which has been recognized by others (Ray et al, 2015), is not unique in
Chinese MS system and corrective measures are imperative, in order to enhance
maritime safety, security and protection of environment.
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3.3.3.5 Cost Effectiveness
The final issue concerned is the cost associated with maritime surveillance, as
pointed out by interviewees A, C and J:

‘’A lot of innovative techniques have been inserted into the system, but the
cost-effectiveness is a concern, like the SAR and manned MPA which account for a
lot of resource but provide only limited support for the maritime surveillance’. (A)
‘The so call long range surveillance measure is not really helpful, we don’t use it at
all, but I heard we pay a lot for their usages. It is pity, we should focus on improving
the coast based system like VTS and AIS’. (C)
‘As a frontline staff of maritime law-enforcement, the current law enforcement
measure is a bit outdated and expensive too, for instance, to catch those illegal sand
transport ships we have to stay in the middle of the seas, like cats and mice’. (J)

The quoted lines indicate that the Chinese MS system needs more cost-effective
measure to improve its efficiency and effectiveness, which are emphasized in the
previous sections 2.2.4.3 and 2.2.6.2.
3.3.4 Discussion
The problems found during the qualitative research are summarized in table 3.3:

Table3.3 Summary of the problems gathered. (Source: made by the author)
Number
1
2
3

Problems within the MS system

Participants

Data fusion is yet in place, and lack of cross-checking
A,C,F
mechanism and long range surveillance capability
Many acquired data is not accurate and the false alarm rate
B,F
is a concern for wasting administration resource
Slow in reaction to emergency, ineffective in gathering E,F,I
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4
5

evidence in terms of pollution or maritime casualties
Acquired data could easily be manipulated; current
D,G
measures cannot pinpoint those suspects
Generally expensive and not cost-effective for providing
A,C,J
support for maritime surveillance

Based on the findings, there are some implications for the decision maker(s) of MSA
and the usage of Chinese MS System: firstly it is imperative for MSA to effectively
combine different vessel surveillance systems and thereby enable them to implement
maritime surveillance performance more effectively; Secondly, the establishment of
a expeditious maritime response system is paramount for MSA in its next phase of
development; Finally, a more proactive and cost-effective MS system should be in
placed to overcome the problems encountered by MSA.

3.4

Overall Maritime Risk Analysis

Beside the problems mentioned, the general maritime risks in the years ahead is
becoming an upward trend which requires China MSA to take additional efforts and
measures to deal with.

3.4.1 Maritime Dangerous Situation Risks
According to the China MSA10 (2011a), the maritime dangerous situation index
includes the number of major maritime accidents and casualties, and the influence
factors can be categorized as vessel, crew, waterway, metrology and management
aspects, based on the statistics from 2005-2014 (3.2.1 & 3.2.2), the relevant factors
are calculated in the following sections.

10

The report calculated and summarize the maritime related risks based on the model proposed by TPRT
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1. Vessel Influence Factor
The vessel influence factor is mainly consisted of vessel structure change rate (the
variance is -0.0238) and maritime casualty change rate (the ratio of this element in
maritime casualty is 0.0453), considering the ratio of the factor related accident
(12%), therefore the vessel influence factor change rate (β1) can be calculated as:
β1＝(-0.0238+ 0.0453)×12%＝0.0026

2. Seafarer Influence Factor
This factor is consisted of crew structure change rate (0.0117) and crew accident
change rate (-0.1178), considering seafarer influence factor related accidents are
about 61% of the total sum, the factor can be calculated:
β2=(0.0117- 0.1178)×61%＝- 0.0647

3. Waterway Influence Factor
This factor mainly considers the change rate (0.0735) of the ratio of this element
related accidents in total strand and groundings cases, combining the 2% waterway
related accident ratio, the factor is calculated as:
β3=0.0735×2% = 0.0015

4. Meteorology Influence Factor
This factor focus on the change rate of the ratio of meteorological factors in collision
and sinking accidents (0.0987), considering the meteorological factors related
accidents’ ratio (13%), the factor could be calculated as:
β4=0.0987 13% = 0.0128

5. Management Influence Factor
The factor mainly includes the change rate of the ratio of management factor in fire
and explosion accidents (0.1571), considering the ratio of management related
accidents (1%), the factor can be calculated:
β5=0.1571 1% = 0.0016
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6. Comprehensive Influence Factor
To sum up the all the influence factors discussed, the comprehensive change rate of
influence factor can be calculated as β:
=β1 +β2+β3+β4+β5=0.0026-0.0647 + 0.0015 + 0.0128 + 0.0016 =-0.046
Therefore, the predicted risks (Ut) associated with maritime transport in China could
be calculated as:
Ut = Ut (2005-2014)× (1+αi )5
And the predicted risks (Uc) associated with maritime casualty in China could be
calculated as:
Uc = Uc(2005-2014)× (1+αi )5×(1+β)
The Annual variance α can be deducted from 3.2.1 and 3.2.2
In sum, the calculations all point to the increasing trend of overall maritime risk in
China for the foreseeable future, and thus China MSA should really be prepared.
3.5

Chapter Summary

This chapter introduced the relationship between maritime surveillance system,
maritime development and related accidents, which proved the positive influence
from the modernizing Chinese MS system. In addition, the author also carries out a
qualitative research to find out problems related to the MS system which were
summarized into 5 categories for further study (three implications for system
improvement). In final part, the author briefly calculated the predicted overall
maritime risk in China for the foreseeable future, which should be carefully managed
and dealt with by China MSA.
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
4.1

Introduction

The protection of coastal areas is becoming an essential requirement for MSA
because of increasing risks like illegal transport and oil spills. Moreover, the control
of vessel traffic is often correlated to environment protection issues, since vessels
carrying hazardous cargos can cause catastrophic disasters11. As discussed, no single
system can provide a completed maritime surveillance solution. Therefore the
Chinese MS system needed improvements to overcome its inherent problems and
address the challenges ahead. As noted earlier, three implications are needed by the
system: a) a high degree of data fusion system should be established, the challenge of
advanced MS systems is not about quantitative gathering capability, but is processing
and integrating information gathered in a clear and concise way to give a adequate
information support for decision maker(s); b) a high level of readiness should be
reached, which allows timely detection and prevention of events threatening
maritime safety and environment; c) a high rate of cost-effectiveness should be
promoted, since cost-effectiveness is a one of the vital prerequisites for a public
domain organization like China MSA. Hence, in this chapter the author will find
some alternatives solutions according to implications mentioned, and determine the
most suitable solution for China MSA maritime surveillance system.

11

i.e., Exxon Valdez, Prestige and Erica
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4.2

Alternative Solutions

As mentioned earlier, Bloisi et al (2015) contended modern maritime surveillance by
maritime authorities is a very challenging task, which include wide monitored areas,
high dynamic background (i.e., waves and wakes) , weather issue (severe weather)
and night-time monitoring. Therefore, the author will take these relevant criteria into
consideration during the search for alternative solution to enhance Chinese MS
system. In following sections, several innovative potentials and off-the-shelf
solutions will be analyzed.
4.2.1 Ship Board VTS
The effectiveness of VTS has been emphasized by many，thus in order to enhance the
functionalities of current VTS, ideas of ship-board VTS has been brought up. As Wu
(2008) proposed, the combination of VTS and MPV system can be a powerful tool to
overcome some drawbacks of VTS (i.e., limited coverage, blind-zone and false radar
signal), in addition with the visualization of VTS (i.e., Transas; Figure 4.1), this
combination seems to be an appealing approach.

Figure 4.1 3D Visualization of VTS system (source: Transas.com)
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In fact, MSA has conducted several experimental projects of shipboard VTS, one of
those was in Shenzhen MSA, but the results showed this method was neither
effective nor cost-effective: 1) although the vessels seemingly enlarge the
surveillance range, the altitude of the vessels severely restricts the radar signal
coverage (i.e., block by islands); 2) the deployment of vessels is highly depended on
weather conditions, which in turn affect the effectiveness; 3) the usage of this
proposal is not cost-effective, due to the high expenditure of fuel consumption and
maintenance of MPVs.
4.2.2 Buoy-mounted Maritime Surveillance System
The short range of the mostly shore-based MS measures have been a deficiency in
current MS system, so as to enlarge the monitor range, a buoy-mounted system has
been propose, for instance, Lessing et al (2006) claimed that buoy-based AIS system
would effectively improve the shore-based AIS shortcomings. While Fefilatyev et al
(2012) suggested that an open-sea visual MS system could be built by non-stationary
CCTV cameras via existing buoys, which could generally increase visual monitoring
range of current system12.

Nevertheless, as Sat-AIS system has already reached the goal of enlarging AIS
coverage, and problems of CCTV surveillance like limited footage range, high
weather dependence and difficult in monitoring certain vessels (Bloisi et al, 2015)
have not (or would not) been resolved. In addition, the bottlenecks of data transport
of off-shore CCTV system and high costs associated with the system’s maintenance
further lead to this proposal not suitable.

12

Pilot programs have been established in the United States of America
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4.2.3 Satellite-based SAR

Surveillance System

13

With the smooth development of Beidou System (Wang and Wang, 2011), the
establishment of satellite-based SAR surveillance system (Foged et al, 2015) has
been

made

possible

for

China

MSA,

and

with

satellite-based

SAR’s

complementation, which further provide a large-range and near real-time monitoring
capability, the current Chinese MS system can become more comprehensive (Figure
4.2).

Figure 4.2 Satellite-based MS System (Source: spie.org)
But according to Fischer and Bauer (2010), satellite images can provide photos over
a wide-range of area, yet the temporal resolution is relatively low, and images are
only a snapshot at a certain time. In addition, as MSA requires more (China MSA,
2011a) real-time, vessel/waterway specific and cost effective maritime surveillance
measures which satellite-based SAR system cannot provide. Therefore, the current
satellite-based SAR technique might falls out of the option basket.

13

Or named space-borne SAR
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4.2.4 Over-The-Horizon-Surface Radar System
The other kind of option for long-range maritime surveillance measure is
Over-The-Horizon Surface Radar (OTHS), which was originally designated for
ocean remote sensing but have been demonstrated to be very reliable in detecting and
tracking vessel at over-the-horizon distances (Figure 4.3), overcoming many
limitations derived from the application of shore-based surveillance systems.
Additionally, the usage of OTHS radar combines with other maritime surveillance
methods, i.e., AIS and SAR, can grant continuous-time coverage of large areas and
provide tracks for non-reporting vessels or detect anomalies in the far-away-from
shore vessel-routes. Hence, OTHS radar can contribute to national-level MDA
(Frazer et al, 2010; Braca et al, 2015).

Figure 4.3 OTHS radar coverage range (Source: http://www.radartutorial.eu/)

Current OTHS-Radar possesses significant but limited wide-area maritime
surveillance capability. However, the application of OTHS-Radar system has been
applied exclusively to military purpose, civilian OTHS radar has mostly remained in
theoretical testing state and far from practical application, basically due to the weak
echo signal, noise and interference effects (Maresca, et al, 2014). Therefore, MSA
should not incorporate OTHS radar into MS system in the near future.
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4.2.5 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (system)
After analyzing the proposals above, it is difficult to find one suitable
complementary solution to Chinese MS system. Nevertheless, one of off-the-shelf
solutions is still appealing and promising for maritime surveillance application,
which is unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) system. In order to delve deeper into this
technique, the following sections will detail UAV’s background, advantages, role of
maritime application and limitations.
4.2.5.1 Background Information
According to Ashworth (2001), the UAVs are “Powered, aerial vehicles that do not
carry a human operator, use aerodynamic forces to provide lift, can fly autonomously
or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry payloads”,
and “these aircraft would usually carry mission-specific sensor payloads or
dispensers. Inclusive vehicles could fly either autonomous, pre-programmed profiles,
or be remotely piloted vehicles (RPV)”. A typical UAV is consisted of different
components, namely aircraft body, processing unit, power unit, sensing unit,
communication unit and remote control unit, and the detailed UAV configuration is
illustrated in Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.4 Typical configuration of a UAV (Source: Vijayavargiya et al, 2016)
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UAV technology, which was originated for military combat purpose, has been
developed swiftly in recent years. The current (5th) advanced generation of UAV
(Figure 4.5) can provides the long-ranged, incessant data process and transport
capability which is one of the most important requirements for vessel detection,
tracking and monitoring. Hence, it is ideal for maritime surveillance.

Figure 4.5 Evolution of UAV (source: http://www.tadspec.com/)
During the rapid development, UAV can be broadly categorized according to
function and size. Based on Kückelhaus (2014), the functional categories of UAV
system can be showed in Table 4.1

Table 4.1 Functional categories of UAV (source: compile by the author)
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6

Category of UAV
Target and decoy
Reconnaissance
Combat
Logistics
Research and development
Civil and commercial UAVs

Function
providing ground and aerial gunnery a
target that simulates an enemy aircraft
providing battlefield intelligence
providing attack capability
delivering cargo
improve UAV technologies
aerial photography, data collection
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According to Gupta et al (2013), the UAVs can be classified into 6 categories, which
illustrated in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2 Category of UAVs (Source: Gupta et al, 2013)

As the focus of this paper, civilian UAV, which the size is between small and tactical
size aircraft, is the suitable candidate to complement the Chinese MS system.

However, without supporting systems, a perfect-performance UAV is just another
airborne-vehicle, and also meaningless in term of maritime surveillance, which
requires sophisticated data acquisition, transportation, processing and analysis.
Therefore, a UAV with relevant and necessary sub-systems, like ground control
station, remote control network, launch and recovery sub-system and etc, is qualified
to be a UAV system which is suitable for multiple missions of maritime surveillance.
As Austin (2011) points out, such system “comprises a number of sub-systems which
include the aircraft (often referred to as a UAV or unmanned air vehicle), its
payloads, the control station(s) (and, often, other remote stations), aircraft launch
and recovery sub-systems where applicable, support sub-systems, communication
sub-systems, transport sub-systems, etc”, which is depicted in Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.6 UAV systems—a functional Structure (Source: Austin, 2011, p9)

4.2.5.2 Advantages of UAV System
A large number of factors highlighted the technical and practical advantages of UAV
system, which were commonly listed included:
a) High surveillance performance capability
According to Liu et al (2014), the overlook characteristic of UAV system provides
maritime authorities a much higher (12 times) surveillance range comparing with
other non-stationary surveillance systems (i.e., MPV, buoy-mounted system), under
the same distance and visibility conditions. Also, with the help of network relay and
supplementary systems, UAV system grants the authority the ability to detect, track
and monitor a suspected vessel (i.e., maritime accidents, oil spills) at any time in any
place (Australian Government, 2015; Vijayavargiya et al, 2016), to effectively
eliminate the ‘blind zone’ of the MS system. Hence, UAV system can overcome the
shortcomings of shore-based surveillance systems and MPV which were described in
2.2.1-2.2.3 & 2.2.6.1.
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b) High practicability
Due to the characteristics of agility (approximately 60-400 km/h), maneuverability,
portability (light weight aircraft body) and readiness (Zhou et al, 2013), UAV system
can be competent for multiple tasks of maritime surveillance, like emergency
response (Yeong et al, 2015): UAVs can expeditiously reach to the sites in short
notice, the low-altitude even-pace flying provides emergency response team the
capability of short-range monitoring and shooting high-resolution videos, which are
valuable for decision maker(s) to avoid ‘information delay’ and unnecessary losses.
In addition, the UAV system equipped with adequate devices can be utilized in life
saving during the search and rescue operations and intelligent information gathering
for oil-spill accidents (Liu, 2014). Such high practicability of UAV offers MS system
the flexible capability to complement the existing systems, like VTS, AIS, CCTV
and SAR.

c) Low associated risks
The other advantage of applying UAV is its low associated risks (Australia
Government, 2015), ad hoc, comparing with MPA system (i.e., pilots) during the
circumstance of severe weather and high-risked environment. UAV system can
effectively cooperate with MPV and MPA system which described in section 2.2.6.1
and 2.2.6.2, timely arriving at scene to carry out high-risked and high-intensity
missions (De Cubber, et al, 2013) like monitoring dangerous cargo vessel accidents
(i.e., leakage, explosion). Also, this low risked characteristic provides UAV system
the ability to execute 24/7 duties even in dangerous areas and heavy weather
situations if necessary, (Zhou et al, 2013) which can complement the MS system by
adding another effective dynamic maritime surveillance measure
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d) Low requirements
Unlike MPV or MPA systems, the requirements for operating and maintaining a
UAV system are relatively low (Liu et al, 2014), especially compared with high
expenditure for initial cost of aircrafts purchase and pilots recruitment. Moreover,
qualification for operators of UAV system is not so restricted, after adequate
trainings and assessments, ordinary staff could be qualified to operate a UAV, thus
greatly facilitate the deployment of UAV system. On the other hand, UAV (i.e.,
rotary UAV) can be launched and recovered in a relatively small space (Zhou et al,
2013), which lead to building of special UAV bases and matched garages
unnecessary. Hence, low requirements from UAV system could further enhance the
flexibility and compatibility of the Chinese MS system which is urgently required.

e) High cost-effectiveness
The final advantage of UAV system application is its superior cost-effectiveness
(Lawler, 2010), especially in comparison with other measures (Table 4.3).
Table 4.3 Economic comparison of different maritime surveillance measures
Measure

Initial
Cost

Fuel Cost
100km/kg

Annual
Cost

VTS

15 million
RMB

N/A

MPV

27million
RMB

1100

Manned
Helicopter

50 million
RMB

40

5 million
RMB

Manned
Fixed-wing

30 million
RMB

80

8 million
RMB

UAV

2 million
RMB

3

0.3
million
RMB

0.5
million
RMB
1 million
RMB

Personnel

Auxiliary
Facility

About 5

Radar
Tower

10 Crew
member +
2 pilot+
ground
service
2 pilot+
ground
service
3 people

Source: compiled by the author based on Zhang (2015)
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Maritime
Bases
Designated
Areas
Runway
Bases
Almost
anywhere

Remark
1.High initial cost
2.High maintenance
3.Constant renewal
1.High costs
2. Complicated system
1.High costs
2.High risks
3.High requirements
1.High costs
2.High risks
3.High requirements
1. Relatively low costs
2. Low risks
3. Low requirements

According to Austin’s (2011) research, UAVs equipped with surveillance sensors
typically are only 3–4% of the weight, require only 2.5% of the engine power (and
3% fuel consumption) and 25% of the size (wing/rotor span) of a light aircraft,
therefore the cost of acquisition and operation of UAV system is much lower than the
manned platforms (MPV, MPA) including training, components and maintenance.
The excellent cost-effectiveness of UAV system can also be augmented by applying
UAV system into daily harbor maritime patrol which could significantly lower
manpower and fuel cost (Duan, 2015), to detect and eliminate hidden dangers in time,
by using autopilot technology (Chao et al, 2010).
4.2.5.3Limitations of UAV System
Although UAV system is filled with advantages and ideal for maritime surveillance
missions, the technology and its related application are not without limitations and
potential problems:
a) Limited coverage
One of the problems UAV system encounters in maritime application is its limited
network coverage (Shenzhen MSA, 2015b), the LOS of typical medium size UAV is
usually about 100-200 kilometers of which the fuel (i.e., battery or diesel) and
remote signal range (i.e., typical station-UAV communication range is about 180km;
(Shenzhen MSA, 2015b)) are taken into consideration. Therefore, single or a few
UAVs might be able to cover ports and the adjacent areas, but the waters further
offshore are out of the reach of UAV surveillance range, which might restricts the
application of UAV system in Chinese MS system.
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b) Malfunction risk
The other potential problem is malfunction risk which usually associated with
electronic devices. Although reliability of UAV system is championed by many (i.e.,
Zhou et al, 2013; Liu et al, 2014; and Yeong et al, 2015), the harsh environment
(high salinity, high humility and high wind-force) within which UAVs are supposed
to work daily would significantly increase the risks of systems’ (i.e., navigation,
remote control ) failures or even break-down, which might ultimately results in total
loss of the UAV and collateral loss in case of related accidents. In addition,
electronic communication channel might be vulnerable by other radio interference
(Zhang, 2015b), which also raise the possibility of losing control of UAVs during
operations.
c) Human factors
The third limitation is human factors. As Hopcroft et al (2006) claim, “despite the
aircraft being unmanned, it is important to remember that humans are still heavily
involved in the operation of UAVs”. Therefore, for the remotely controlled of
automated UAVs to be used safely and effectively, a number of human factors need
to be considered and accounted for, like potentials for human errors during the
surveillance mission planning, route design, maintenance and operations. Also, the
automated UAV systems, which like any other newly introduced technologies
(Lützhöft et al, 2002), might generate potential hazards during their operations in
ports and busy waterways (Hetherington et al, 2006).
d) Technical and weather limitations
The final limitation in according with the maritime surveillance application of UAV
system is the technical limits and uncertainties. For example, the study of Saif et al
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(2014) revealed the difficulties of image acquisition of fast moving objects and the
problem of transporting large amount of data back to control station stably and
reliably. Also, even the deployments of UAVs are considered low-risked, the
dispatchment of UAVs are still heavily determined by weather conditions, because of
the properties at stake.
4.3

Summary of Potential Solutions

As discussed, a few innovative potential and off-the-shelf alternative options, which
have distinct advantages and disadvantages (Table 4.4), are available for improving
the current Chinese MS system. After taking criteria detailed in Chapter 3 and
section 4.1-4.2, the author proposes the application of UAV system as a suitable
solution, which will be detailed in next chapter, to problems and challenges faced by
the China MSA. Along with the necessities mentioned, the feasibility of applying
UAV technology will also be analyzed in chapter 5.
Table 4.4 Summary of the Potential Solutions (Source: made by the author)
Solution
Advantage
Disadvantage
Ship board VTS
Buoy-mounted
surveillance system

1. Easy to equipped;
2. Flexible for deployment;
3. Enlarge existing VTS monitor areas
Enlarge existing MS system monitor areas

1. Easily be blocked;
2. Restricted range;
3. Low cost-effective
1. Limited range;
2. Restricted usage;
3. Maintenance cost
1. Not real-time;
2. Low resolution
3. Low cost-effective

Satellite-based
SAR

1. Wide-range areas surveillance;
2. Near real-time surveillance

OTHS radar system

Long-range real time surveillance

1. No civilian usage;
2. Expensive

1. High surveillance performance capability;
2. High practicability;
3. Low associated risks;
4. Low requirements;
5. High cost-effectiveness

1. Limited coverage;
2. Malfunction risks;
3. Human factors;
4. Technical limits

UAV system
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4.4

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, the author has searched various kinds of alternative measures to solve
the problems and challenges faced by the Chinese MS system, in line with the
criteria discussed in previous chapters and the beginning of this chapter. After careful
study and comparison, the author deems UAV system, which the details of system
will be provided in chapter 5, as an ideal solution for improving the effectiveness and
enhancing the overall capability of Chinese MS system. Therefore, UAV system and
related applications and constructions should be recommended to the decision
maker(s) of China MSA for further research and consideration.
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CHAPTER 5
ESTABLISHING OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE MARITIME
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM
5.1

Introduction

In recent years, UAV plays a more significant role in fields, inter alia, maritime
patrol (Zhou et al, 2013; Liu et al, 2014), surveillance (Duan, 2015; Australian
government, 2015) and search and rescue (Garratt et al, 2007; De Cubber, et al, 2013;
Yeong et al, 2015), range of application of UAV has been expanded drastically,
countries like United States (Weatherington, 2005), France and Japan have all
implemented UAV system for maritime governance. In fact, with the relaxing control
over low-altitude air space and the cancellation of vessels visa system in China
(Zhang, 2015b), China MSA has initiated pilot programs of UAV in Guangzhou and
Tianjin (Liu et al, 2014), but the way toward a comprehensive UAV maritime
surveillance system is still far away, due to the lack of researches and legal hurdles.
Also, as an innovative maritime technology, technical and management problems
still exist within the UAV system, therefore, this chapter will introduce an
appropriate UAV system designated for China MSA, including the system design,
application range, limitations and recommendations, a feasibility analysis will be
conducted, to further facilitate the establishment of a comprehensive Chinese
maritime UAV system.
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5.2

Proposed Solution

In addition to problems discussed in Chapter 3, the pending cancellation of vessel
visa and rapid development of maritime transport (Shenzhen MSA, 2015b) require
additional measures to achieve effective maritime governance for China MSA.
Therefore, in order to substantially improve the effectiveness and enhance
surveillance capability of the Chinese MS system, this paper proposes the
establishment of a comprehensive UAV system, which can complement existing
Chinese MS system (Figure 5.1) and facilitate the setting of ‘three-dimension’ (Liu et
al, 2014; Zhang, 2015b) maritime surveillance system , to fully achieve the goal of
effective maritime surveillance and expeditious search and rescue proposed by MSA
(2011a; 2011b).

Figure 5.1 Expected overall IT system of China MSA
(Source: edited by author based on China MSA (2011b))
In accordance with criteria discussed and top-down design for the informatization of
China MSA, the establishment of UAV should follow certain general principles:
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a) Reliability
Due to the harsh environment surrounded by UAVs, UAV system should be as
reliable as possible, for instance, reliable communication network and dependable
electronic surveillance devices, in order to carry out daily missions.

b) Practicability
The establishment of UAV system should take various types of geographical
landscapes and different MSAs conditions into consideration, to satisfy specific
needs of maritime surveillance rather than the overall needs.

c) Cost-effectiveness
As an important public domain organization, the cost-effectiveness should be
carefully evaluated, which means establishment of UAV system should take
advantages of existing system network and be integrated with other MS systems, so
as to lower associated cost as much as possible.

d) Easy for maintenance
One of the advantages of UAVs is its flexibility and portability, therefore proposed
UAV system should be easy for maintenance and operation for ordinary staff of
MSA.
5.2.1 Maritime UAV System Functionality
The proposed UAV system should be consisted of multiple functions which are based
on the criteria discussed and the practical situation of MSA, the detailed functions of
UAV system are described as follow:
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a) Maritime law-enforcement
High-resolution camera and sensors equipped UAVs can be applied for aperiodic
aerial maritime patrol, which can be a powerful deterrent for illegal transport,
overloading, illegal underwater construction and dumping, to manage and guarantee
the maritime safety and protection of environment in the jurisdiction of China MSA.

b) Emergency response
UAVs, which could arrive at scene in time, can provide needed aerial imagery for
emergency response mission. Specifically, UAVs can monitor (dangerous) situations
from the air and then forward those collected information, which are essential for
emergency response, to decision maker(s) at ground/vessel for forming further action
plans.

c) Search and rescue
Within UAV system, long range fixed-wing UAV or ship carried rotary-wind UAV
(Figure 5.2) can cover large areas in a shorter period of time and provide access to
difficult-to-reach areas, for missions like searching of MH370. In addition,
life-saving appliance equipped UAV can immediately provide essential supports for
victims (Yeong et al, 2015) of maritime accidents (i.e., SEWOL ferry).

Figure 5.2 Example of ship carried UAV (Source: Garratt et al, 2007)
62

d) Information relay
Beside emergency response, UAVs can act as an “information hub” (Figure 5.3) for
various maritime missions, like maritime law enforcement, search and rescue and
incessant maritime communication, which can be critically important in the absent of
shored-based and satellite provided (i.e., maritime satellite) information network.

Figure 5.3 UAV Information/Data relay framework (Source: Austin (2011))

e) Oil spills and waste dumping detection
The early hours of oil spills or related accidents are crucial for containment and
subsequent clean-up efforts, otherwise without early detection and containment,
major oil spills could cause catastrophic disasters (i.e., Prestige). Therefore, UAV
system should be able to provide timely first-handed information for emergency
response mission. Additionally, UAV system should also provide an effective mean
to pinpoint and track those responsible for illegal dumping (i.e., drainage or ballast
water).

f) Navigation lantern maintenance
Navigation lanterns, which usually located at isolated islands and remote areas, are
difficult for maintenance. In order to lower associated maintenance cost, UAV system
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can achieve cost-effective patrol and examine navigation lanterns by providing
real-time working status and avoid unnecessary manned maintenance.
5.2.2 Requirements for Maritime UAVs
To achieve designated goals of UAV system mentioned, requirements for UAVs are
listed as follow:

1) Low requirements for taking-off and landing (TOAL, i.e., rotary-wing UAV)
and high reliability (no-failure life should be more than 2,000 hours);
2) Higher speed (Maximum speed should not be less than 70km/hour), adequate
cruising radius (i.e., for harbor designated UAV, fully-loaded should not be less than
1.5 hour and 120 kilometers, idle loaded 2.5 hours and 200 kilometers) and sufficient
anti-wind capacity (not less than 7 level of Beaufort scale);
3) Maximum cruising altitude should reach at least 2,000 meters;
4) Accurate location (latitude & longitude) identification capability and
real-time (image) information transmit capability (two-way between control centers);
5) Autopilot or pre-planning route aerial patrol, automatically return to base or
switch manual control in case of emergency;
6) Necessary safety protection procedures, for instance, dangerous zones
identification, auto hazards avoidance, malfunction and fuel alarm, auto-return in
case of losing control.
5.2.3 Off-the-shelf UAVs
To meet requirements listed above, there are a few advanced off-the-shelf UAVs
available (Table 5.1) for the establishment of Chinese maritime UAV system:
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Table 5.1 Off-the-shelf UAVs for Chinese maritime UAV system14
UAV Type/
Nationality

Performance

Features

Functions

1.R-wind radius 2.5m

1. Easy to control

2.Max
L speed 90km/h

2.Flexible;

1. Real-time surveillance

LH-Aviation

3.Max load 1.5 hours

3.Expandbale;

2. Law enforcement

(France)

4.Max wind 8-level

4.Portable

3. Traffic control

5.Max altitude 3048m

5.Cost-effective

1.R-wind radius 3 m

1.High performance

2.Max speed 120km/h

2.Safe and reliable

3.Max load 2 hours

3.Light body

4.Max wind 8-level

4.Excellent

5.Max altitude 3048m

surveillance ability

NEOs-300
(Switzerland)

1.R-wind radius 3.3 m

APID-60
(Sweden)

2.Max speed 110km/h
3.Max load 4.5 hours
4.Max wind 8-level
5.Max altitude 3000m

TANAN300
(France)

Model

1.Maritime surveillance
2. Law enforcement
3.Support for SAR

1.Easy to control;
2.Safe and reliable;
3.Cost-effective;
4.Adaptable

4. Oil detection
1.Maritime surveillance
2. Law enforcement
3. Emergency response
4.Support for SAR
5. Oil detection

1.R-wind radius 4.5m

1.Easy to TOL;

1.Maritime surveillance

2.Max speed 150km/h

2. Easy maintenance

2. Law enforcement

3.Max load 8 hours

3.High functionality

3.Emergency response

4.Max wind 9-level

4.Multiple mission

4. Search and rescue

5.Max altitude 4000m

capability

5.Information hub

2.Max speed 100km/h

1.Easy to control

1.Maritime surveillance

3.Max load 4 hour

2.Cost-effective

2. Law enforcement

4.Max wind 8-level

3.Made in China

3.Emegency response

1.R-wind radius 3.7m

U8
(China)

5.Max altitude 3600m

(Source: compiled by the author based on sources online)

After researches of applicable and available UAVs for the Chinese MS system, it is
clear from the table above that the rotary-wind UAVs would be the ideal component
for the proposed establishment of Chinese maritime UAV system.

All of the UAVs provided have already been prescreened by the Shenzhen MSA which the author as one of the
participating members
14
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5.2.4 Data Fusion System
It is of vital importance to generate real-time wide-area maritime monitoring pictures
by UAV system for operators of the maritime surveillance system to carry out
multiple missions. Nevertheless, without the cross-check of other real-time
intelligence information (i.e., VTS, AIS and COMPASS), such pictures or videos are
less reliable and effective for maritime authorities, especially within the ports and
coastal regions. Therefore, a data fusion system (Figure 5.4) is required for the
proposed UAV system to integrate its data with other intelligence sources from the
existing MS system (Table 5.2), so as to maximize the effectiveness of proposed
UAV system.
Table 5.2 Integrating maritime surveillance data of China MSA
Data Source

Content/Format

Origin Mean

Reliability

Availability

VTS

Dynamic Encrypted data

VTS MIS system

Readily available

AIS

Static/dynamic message
standard data

AIS data base

CCTV

Dynamic video data

MSA data centers

LRIT

Semi-dynamic standard
LRIT data centre
info data

high
high, except busy
water areas
Depend on weather
High in Inmarsat-C
terminal

Sat-AIS

Static/dynamic message
standard data

According to the
contracts

Lower than AIS

Depend on the
contract

SAR

Dynamic Image format

According to the
contracts

High in most cases

Depend on the
contract

COMPASS

Dynamic Encrypted data

According to the
contracts

Medium

Depend on the
contract

MPV

Dynamic data

MSA data centers

Relatively High

Relatively High

MPA

Dynamic data

According to the
contracts

Depend on weather

Depend on the
contract

UAV

Dynamic data

MSA data centers

Relatively High

Readily available

Source: compiled by author inspired by Sun (2015)
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Readily available
Readily available
Readily available

Figure 5.4 Proposed Data fusion system for Chinese maritime surveillance system
(Source: edited by author based on Sun (2015))
5.2.5 Proposed UAV System Architecture
After above descriptions, it is clear that proposed maritime UAV system relies on
rotary-winds UAV as flying platform which usually equipped with surveillance
appliance like high resolution cameras, airborne-VTS, IR sensors and AIS system. To
control and support UAVs, supporting ground control system should be consisted of
at least two shore-based control centers, one portable control unit and one
vessel-based control unit, which can directly or through relay data hub communicate
or control UAVs by WIMAX or similar existing information network. The acquired
information data can be transmitted back to the command center through these units,
after integrating with other intelligence data (i.e., VTS) the information can thus be
provided to decision maker(s) for further actions. Hence, UAVs, supporting control
unites and data fusion system together can form a comprehensive maritime UAV
system15 (Figure 5.5) which can provide useful support and complement the Chinese
MS system.

15

The model is made by the author based on the pilot maritime UAV project proposed by Shenzhen MSA
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Figure 5.5 Architecture of proposed maritime UAV system (Source: made by author)

In addition, maritime UAV system should be further specified its distribution
according to China MSA practical situation, which is similar with sub-systems of
Chinese MS system, the UAV system should be comprised of at least one top-level
command and control centers, 14 province-level command centers and various
numbers of ground and vessel control unites. As of specific mission, each UAV
system should be specified (Figure 5.6) in line with maritime zones outlined by
UNCLOS (Mukherjee, 2015), areas beyond EEZ are not included16:

1) Port and adjacent areas (0-44.448km)
According to UNCLOS, 24 mile (12 miles territorial sea and 12 miles contiguous
zones) off-shore areas are considered sovereign or semi-sovereign for the coastal
State (China). Therefore, effective and sufficient UAVs (LH-aviation or NEOs-300
equivalent or above) should be deployed to carry out maritime surveillance missions
like law enforcement, traffic control, fighting illegal transport and dumping, oil spills,
emergency response and etc.
16

This paper mainly focus on the validated jurisdiction managed by China MSA
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2) Medium range areas (44.448-150km)
The areas further offshore (beyond 24nm or 44.448km) are within exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) which the rights of the coastal State (China) diminished
seaward, but there are still many interests at stake, like oil pollution accidents, search
and rescue (Chapter 1), smugglings and potentially terrorist attacks. In order to deal
with these risks and challenges, UAVs should be expeditious and powerful, like
APID-60 or TANAN-300 equivalent or above.

3) Long range areas (150-370.4km)
The seas further than 150 km but still within the EEZ line are considered long range
areas which are often not covered by conventional maritime surveillance measures
mentioned, but thus areas are usually accident prone and difficult to monitor due to
the distance and sea conditions. Therefore, UAVs designated for these areas should
be at least as powerful as TANAN-300 or above.

Figure 5.6 Distribution of UAVs
(Source: edited by author based on Austin (2011))
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To sum up, maritime UAV system for enhancing the Chinese MS system has
generally been introduced. A major advantage of the proposed UAV system is that a
more comprehensive and effective MS system can be built by introduction of the
real-time situation awareness provided system. Furthermore, the proposed UAV
system can also complement the current MS system by filling the “surveillance gap”
between shore-based and long-range maritime surveillance measures (Figure 5.7).

Figure 5.7 Classification of Enhanced Chinese MS System by surveillance range
(Source: made by the author)
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5.3

Feasibility Analysis of Establishing UAV System for China MSA

However, there is still a long way to go for the meaningful application of proposed
maritime UAV system for China MSA, inter alia, administrative and legal problems
(Zhou et al, 2013; Huang, 2014) will be difficult hurdles. In this section, this paper
will conduct a feasibility analysis to summarize some problems and try to find out
feasible solutions.
5.3.1 Administrative Issues
As an innovative measure and new add-in application for MSA, proposed UAV
system related administrative problems, like procedures for UAVs missions,
administrative integration with other systems, will be unavoidable and tricky.
However, report of top-level design for the informatization for China MSA China
MSA (2011b) and report 13th 5 years plans for maritime administration (TPRT, 2014)
indicate that leadership has determined to fully modernize MSA with the Sensing
Ship strategy (Figure 5.8). As crucial part of the overall strategy, author convinces
such issues would be overcome by the strong supports from the MSA leadership.

Figure 5.8 Sensing Ship Strategy by MSA (Source: China MSA (2011b))
71

5.3.2 Regulatory Issues
The single major obstruction for early application of UAV system for MSA in the
past is the airspace regulation which imposed by the air force of PLA (Huang and
Zhou, 2010). However, as a result of support from the leadership of Chinese
government, the controls of low altitude airspaces are due to relax (Shenzhen MSA,
2015b), according to the Regulation for Managing the Usage of Low Altitude
Airspace. In fact, from the results of pilot programs of MSA (Liu et al, 2014), thus
issues could be resolved. Therefore, from the regulatory prospective, wide-range of
applying UAVs for maritime surveillance related missions will be admissible, since
most of working-altitudes of the proposed UAVs are well below 1000 meters.
5.3.3 Legal Issues
The other issues might worth concern is legal usage of electronic devices for law
enforcement, which might be a problem for maritime authorities to prosecute
suspects by using videos or images acquired through UAV system (Huang, 2014),
because of the complexity of legal procedures. But maritime authorities can jointly
work with other legal authorities to set up a mechanism to validate video or image
evidences which can be used in the court, taking reference to the traffic police which
law enforcement has heavily depended on CCTV cameras to obtains images or
videos to fine traffic rules violators.
5.3.4 Safety Concerns
The final problem which might hinders the application of maritime UAV system is
safety concerns, as more accidents (or dangerous situations) emerged alongside the
widespread usage of amateur UAVs recently. Yet according to the report of
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Australian Government (2015), professional UAVs, which using resilience
engineering and fault tolerance techniques, are extremely reliable comparing with
other civilian UAVs. Therefore, China MSA should closely cooperate with the UAV
manufacturers and airspace regulators to ensure the safe application of maritime
UAV system.

On all counts, although meaningful application of maritime UAV system for MSA is
still a long way to go and problems ahead are challenging, but with the supports of
top-level leadership and technology advancement, the paper deems the wide-range of
maritime UAV system application for MSA is feasible and highly practicable.

5.4

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, main principles, functionalities, requirements of proposed UAV
system for China MSA have been detailed, according to criteria and requirements
reviewed and discussed. Available and applicable UAVs as well as data fusion
system and system architecture are also provided subsequently so as to complete the
overall picture of Chinese maritime UAV system. To further justify and facilitate the
establishment of such system, the author conducted a feasibility analysis of UAV
system for MSA under current circumstances, which show that even certain concerns
remain, it is not only feasible but also practicable to apply the UAV technology into
Chinese MS system, by incorporating a comprehensive maritime UAV system.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
6.1

Summary

The purpose of this research paper is to provide a critical review of the Chinese MS
system and offer a viable recommendation for decision maker(s) of China MSA,
specifically, establishing a Chinese maritime UAV system:

At the beginning, this paper has carried out a careful review of the Chinese MS
system in the Chapter 2, and reached a conclusion that current system is far from
perfect and there are problems lie within. Additionally, challenges and maritime
risks associated with maritime transport in China have been introduced in Chapter 3
by a qualitative analysis to demonstrate the urgent need for enhancing Chinese MS
system in order to improve maritime safety. Subsequently, the author carried out
researches on finding an applicable solution for MSA in Chapter 4, and deemed
UAV system will be the viable choice for improving Chinese MS system in a
cost-effective and practical manner, by critically analyzing UAV technology and
related systems. Finally, broad requirements and detailed description of system
architecture of the proposed maritime UAV system has been introduced in Chapter 5,
and in order to prove the feasibility of applying maritime UAV system, a feasibility
analysis has been conducted which the paper concluded that such UAV system is not
only feasible but also practical.

74

6.2

Limitations

Firstly, this research is constrained by various factors, such as a limited time and
accessible resource (statistics), when exploring problems and risks faced by China
MSA in term of maritime surveillance and governance, the lack of quantitative data
restricts the objectivity which the qualitative research cannot fully provide. In
addition, due to geographical distance covered in the qualitative research, telephone
interviews were adopted. But such interviews might result in the loss of certain
information, which can be gained via direct observation. Furthermore, the proposed
model for UAV system is still far from mature for immediate application by China
MSA, because of limited knowledge and resources of the author. Finally, due to the
time and resource restrictions, this research paper does not specify technical details
of the comprehensive UAV system which provides room for further research.

6.3

Implications for Further Research

There are some implications for China MSA and related stakeholders (i.e., TPRT and
CTTI) to conduct more objective researches and studies to further improve the
current Chinese maritime surveillance system:

1) The quantitative research of cost-effectiveness of Chinese MS system should be
carefully conducted to further justify the establishment of the maritime UAV system.
2) Top-level design of Chinese maritime UAV system should be thorough conducted
by China MSA and related research institutes like CTTI; relevant studies of setting
up UAV designated departments in MSA should also be carried out.
3) Experimental program should be carried out to test the validity and effectiveness
of proposed maritime UAV system which is supposed to combine with other
sub-systems of Chinese MS system and meet the needs of local MSA.
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APPENDIX: A Satellite Status of BEIDOU Navigation system
Satellite

Launch
date

BeiDou-1A

2000-10-30 16:02

Launch
site
XichangLC-2

Carrier
rocket

PRN

Chang Zheng 3A

Orbit

N/A

GEO 140°E

Status

Retired
December 2011

BeiDou-1B

2000-12-20 16:20

Xichang LC-2

Chang Zheng 3A

N/A

GEO 80°E

BeiDou-1C

2003-05-24 16:34

Xichang LC-2

Chang Zheng 3A

N/A

GEO 110.5°E

Retired
December 2012

BeiDou-1D

2007-02-02 16:28

Xichang LC-2

Chang Zheng 3A

N/A

GEO 86°E

Retired
February 2009

Compass-M1 2007-04-13 20:11

Xichang LC-2

Chang Zheng 3A

C30

MEO ~21,500 km

Retired
Compass-G2

2009-04-14 16:16

Xichang LC-2

Chang Zheng 3C

N/A

GEO drifting

Compass-G1

2010-01-16 16:12

Xichang LC-2

Chang Zheng 3C

C01

GEO 140.0°E
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Remark

Operational

1st
generation
experiment
al satellite

In-orbit
validation

Satellite

Launch
date

Launch
site

Carrier
rocket

PRN

Orbit

Compass-G3

2010-06-02 15:53

Xichang LC-2

Chang Zheng 3C

C03

GEO 110.5°E

Compass-IG
SO1

2010-07-31 21:30

Xichang LC-3

Chang Zheng 3A

C06

55°
inclination IGSO118°E

Compass-G4

2010-10-31 16:26

Xichang LC-2

Chang Zheng 3C

C04

GEO 160.0°E

Compass-IG
SO2

2010-12-17 20:20

Xichang LC-3

Chang Zheng 3A

C07

55° inclination IGSO
118°E

Compass-IG
SO3

2011-04-09 20:47

Xichang LC-3

Chang Zheng 3A

C08

55° inclination IGSO
118°E

Compass-IG
SO4

2011-07-26 21:44

Xichang LC-3

Chang Zheng 3A

C09

55° inclination IGSO
95°E

Compass-IG
SO5

2011-12-01 21:07

Xichang LC-3

Chang Zheng 3A

C10

55° inclination IGSO
95°E
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Status

Operational

Remark

Satellite

Launch
date

Launch
site

Carrier
rocket

PRN

Orbit

2012-02-24 16:12

Xichang LC-2

Chang Zheng 3C

C05

GEO 58.75°E

Compass-M3 2012-04-29 20:50

Xichang LC-2

Chang Zheng 3B

C11

MEO ~21,500 km

Compass-M4 2012-04-29 20:50

Xichang LC-2

Chang Zheng 3B

C12

MEO ~21,500 km

Compass-M5 2012-09-18 19:10

Xichang LC-2

Chang Zheng 3B

C13

MEO ~21,500 km

Compass-M2 2012-09-18 19:10

Xichang LC-2

Chang Zheng 3B

C14

MEO ~21,500 km

Compass-G6

2012-10-25 15:33

Xichang LC-2

Chang Zheng 3C

C02

GEO 80°E

BDS I1-S

2015-03-30 13:52

Xichang LC-2

Chang Zheng
3C/YZ-1

C31

55° inclination
IGSO

BDS M1-S

2015-07-25
12:29

Xichang LC-2

Chang Zheng
3B/YZ-1

C34

MEO ~21,500 km

Compass-G5
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Status

Remark

Satellite

Launch
date

Launch
site

Carrier
rocket

PRN

Orbit

BDS M2-S

2015-07-25
12:29

Xichang LC-2

Chang Zheng
3B/YZ-1

C33

MEO ~21,500 km

BDS I2-S

2015-09-29
23:13

Xichang LC-3

Chang Zheng 3B

C32

55° inclination
IGSO

BDS M3-S

2016-02-01
07:29

Xichang LC-2

Chang Zheng
3C/YZ-1

Status

MEO ~21,500 km
In commissioning

Compass-IG
SO6

2016-03-29
20:11

Xichang LC-2

Chang Zheng 3A
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C15

55° inclination
IGSO 95°E

Remark

APPENDIX: B Interviewees Information
Interviewees
A
B
C

D

E
F
G

H

I

J

K

L

Job Title

Job Description

Infrastructure Planning

MSA infrastructure planning

Manager

and implementation

Senior VTS Operator
Senior Search and

VTS duty and operation
Trans-department search and

Rescue Coordinator

rescue coordination

Senior Anti-pollution

Anti-pollution policy and

Expert

implementation consultancy

Search and Rescue

Maritime search and rescue

Coordinator

coordination

VTS Manager
Senior Frontline Staff
of Law Enforcement
Frontline Staff of Law
Enforcement
Frontline Staff of Law
Enforcement
Frontline Staff of Law
Enforcement
Frontline Staff of Law
Enforcement
Frontline Staff of Law
Enforcement
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Experience
23 years
27 years
18 years

23 years

12 years

VTS management

20 years

Maritime law enforcement

19 years

Maritime law enforcement

10 years

Maritime law enforcement

7 years

Maritime law enforcement

6 years

Maritime law enforcement

6 years

Maritime law enforcement

6 years

APPENDIX: C List of Questions
Number

Question Content

1

What is your job title?

2

Can you briefly describe the duty of yours?

3

How long have you been working in China MSA?

4

Do you know the Chinese maritime surveillance system and its
component sub-systems?

5

Please describe your knowledge of the Chinese maritime surveillance
system and the relevance with your job duty.

6

How do you evaluate the current Chinese maritime surveillance
system?

7

Please give a few (at least one) examples to support your view.

8

Can you describe the shortcoming(s) of the Chinese maritime
surveillance system?

9

Can you provide some recommendation to (further) improve the
current Chinese maritime surveillance system?
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APPENDIX: D Interview Transcripts Sample
Interviewer: I'm glad that you have the time to share your opinions, should we start?
Interviewee F: Ok, let's do it.
Interviewer: Could you briefly tell me about your job title, description of your job and your
relevant experience of your duty?
Interviewee F: Well, as you know I have been in the MSA for almost 20 years and been in a lot
of position during the time, now I currently working at the branch-level MSA as a VTS manager
to oversee the daily operation of the VTS center, my main duty is in charge of the VTS center
management, VTS related-policy consultancy, and emergency response (i.e., research and rescue,
oil spills and collision accidents) coordination which is also the main duty of the VTS of China
MSA, to enhance maritime safety and environmental protection.
Interviewer: As a senior MSA veteran, you must know clearly about the Chinese maritime
surveillance system and its component sub-systems, like Sat-AIS and LRIT
Interviewee F: I cannot say I know clearly about the system because I am just a manager of VTS
and know mostly about the VTS and related systems like AIS and CCTV, but I have to admit that
over the past years, the maritime surveillance system has been improving greatly and provide us
means that we cannot dream of at the time I first joined the MSA in the last century. Today, we
can sit in the VTS room to monitor the real-time situation of the ports which can significantly
improve the safety at sea, for instance, if one suspicious activity of a vehicle has been caught by
our VTS operators, we can pinpoint the vehicle by AIS and using VHF to make contact with the
vessel, otherwise we can deploy our maritime patrol vehicle to make further investigation and
adjustment, but of course most vessels will obey and follow our instructions. Talking about the
systems you mentioned, I know a little bit about them but never use them.
Interviewer: So I assume you think the current Chinese maritime surveillance system is superb
if not perfect?
Interviewee F: I did not say so, even I am proud of the development progress of the maritime
surveillance system during the past decades, but that does not mean I am greatly satisfied by the
current situation and performance of the maritime surveillance system.
Interviewer: Then how do you evaluate the current maritime surveillance system, if possible
please give me an example.
Interviewee F: The current maritime surveillance system of course can satisfy many of our
needs in terms of guaranteeing maritime safety and marine environmental protection, otherwise it
will be overhauled and readjusted then. But it still has many of disadvantages, and shortcoming
which might not fit into the development of maritime industry. Take the VTS surveillance as an
instance, in VTS center, we can only rely on what we have here, if something (accident) happens
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beyond the reach of the system, for example AIS, we can do nothing about it. LRIT and Sat-AIS
are just too distant (and expensive) for us to use. Also, the VTS false alarm is concern, because
the (MS) system is not really reliable, for instance the currents or small floating objects might
easily be recognized as vessels by the VTS radar, sometimes is difficult for us to discern
especially in busy water, like in Shanghai or Shenzhen port.
Interviewer: Okay, since you mostly talk about maritime safety, can you tell me more of the
shortcomings of the MS system, in realm like marine environmental protection?
Interviewee F: The maritime surveillance system has been improving the performance of
maritime marine environmental protection, especially in the port areas, to greatly reduce the
pollution (i.e., lower the chance of oil spills and dangerous cargo leakage or explosion). However,
the system is without drawbacks, for example, there are problems for us to prosecute those
offenders in terms of vessel-source pollutions, and the problem bothers me the most is the
evidence gathering for illegal discharge of vessel-source pollutants, the existing means are either
no use or too slow, many times we can only watch pollutions happening without arresting those
responsible. Therefore, the system lacks of an effective and expeditious mean in this regard.
Interviewer: So do you have any suggestions on how the Chinese maritime surveillance system
should be improved or adjusted?
Interviewee F: As I have mentioned, the characteristics of the limited distance of maritime
surveillance system should be improved, by adding more effective long-distance surveillance
measures, the ready-to-use systems like LRIT are just too ineffective and too remote for us.
Secondly, in order to tackle the false alarm issue, a more accurate real-time surveillance measure
should be incorporated into the current maritime surveillance system, because none of the current
maritime surveillance measures can satisfy this demand. At last, the works of vessel-source
pollution prevention should be better supported by a more expeditious surveillance method.
Interviewer: It seems you have all respond to the problems you raised previously, do you have
any other more recommendations? How about the maritime unmanned aerial vehicle?
Interviewee F: The only thing I want to emphasize is that we cannot only focus on the current
situation and forget the big-picture, we as an implementation department should jointly work
with related institution to further assess and improve the MS system. Maritime UAV is a big hit
recently, and I know that in Tianjin and Guangzhou the pilot programs is processing, let’s see the
result before any comments made by the outsiders like me, but truth to be told, I like the idea.
Interviewer: Do you have any other suggestions to say?
Interviewee F: Well, I’m pretty sure that would be more than enough for you, isn’t it?
Interviewer: Ha ha, thank you for participating in my interview!
Interviewee F: You are welcome.
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